Attorneys before the Grand Jury:  Assertion of the Attorney--Clinet Privilege to Protect a Client\u27s Identity by Glanzer, Seymour & Taskier, Paul R.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 75
Issue 4 Winter Article 2
Winter 1984
Attorneys before the Grand Jury: Assertion of the




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Seymour Glanzer, Paul R. Taskier, Attorneys before the Grand Jury: Assertion of the Attorney--Clinet Privilege to Protect a Client's
Identity, 75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1070 (1984)
0091-4169/84/7504-1070
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 75, No. 4
Copyright 0 1984 by Northwestern University School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
ATTORNEYS BEFORE THE GRAND JURY:
ASSERTION OF THE ATTORNEY-





With increasing frequency lawyers are summoned to testify
before federal grand juries about what may be one of the most im-
portalit of their client's communications: the client's identity.' This
is particularly troubling when it is possible that revelation of that
identity would result in the client's indictment. It is apparent from a
number of recent investigations 2 that attorney testimony before the
* Partner of the law firm Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin, Washington, D.C. LL.B., New
York Law School, 1960; B.S.,Juilliard-New York University, 1955. Former Chief, Fraud
Section, United States Attorney's Office, District of Columbia.
* * Associate of the law firm Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin, Washington, D.C. J.D., Ge-
orgetown University Law Center, 1982; B.A., Tufts University, 1978.
1 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35 (Durant), 723 F.2d 447 (6th
Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as In re Durant], cert. denied sub nom. Durant v. United States,
104 S. Ct. 3524 (1984); In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1983) (amicus
briefs filed by National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers Inc. and Calif. Attorneys for
CriminalJustice suggesting national pattern of governmental abuse of subpoena process
to interfere with professional relationship between targets of grand jury investigations
and their attorneys); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.
1982) (en banc) [hereinafter cited as In re Pavlick]; In re GrandJury Proceedings (Jones),
517 F.2d 666, 874 (5th Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as In re Jones] (sole motive of gov-
ernment in examination of attorneys to corroborate or supplement already-existent in-
formation about persons suspected of income tax offenses); Zwerling, Federal GrandJuries
v. Attorney Independence and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 27 HASTINGs L.J. 1263 (1976);
Comment, Assertion of the Attorney-Client Privilege To Protect the Client's Identity, 28 U. CHI. L.
REV. 533 (1961); Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege as a Protection of Client Identity: Can
Defense Attorneys be the Prosecution's Best Witnesses?, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 81 (1983) [herein-
after cited as Comment, Prosecution's Best Witnesses?]. The scope of this Article is limited
to federal law, and does not purport to address questions of privilege among the states
and before state grand juries.
2 See United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena Duces Tecum (Shargel), 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984) [hereinafter cited as In re
Shargel]; In Matter of Witnesses Before Special March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489
(7th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter cited as In re March 1980 GrandJury]; In re Durant, 723 F.2d
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grand jury has become an increasingly favored tool of prosecutors
in discovering information or proof necessary to build a case against
the target of an investigation. This development has serious impli-
cations for every practicing attorney; it is by no means limited to
attorneys who practice criminal law. The majority of cases involving
the need to compel testimony from an attorney before the grand
jury concern legal advice tendered by corporate or tax lawyers,
which later becomes the subject of government scrutiny.
This Article will discuss: (1) the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege; (2) the possibility of intervention for a client who fears
that defense counsel will not risk being held in contempt and will
disclose the client's identity; (3) the general rule excluding the di-
ent's identity from the protection of the attorney-client privilege; (4)
the exceptions to that rule; (5) the important recent decisions in this
area; and (6) the possibility of expanding fifth. amendment protec-
tions defined under Fisher v. United States3 to situations in which
identity is not itself a confidential communication, but where revela-
tion of identity would serve as a "link in the chain of evidence" lead-
ing to indictment.4 This Article, in line with Fisher, also will
advocate the position that a client's privilege in communications
with his attorney is co-extensive with the client's fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.
The problem of protecting client identity has been addressed
by numerous courts, and recent decisions in the Second, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits,5 rejecting the claim of privilege
where incrimination was a clear factor, make more pressing than
ever the need to develop a coherent and fair approach that fully
comprehends the purpose of the attorney-client privilege and, in
certain of these cases, the fifth amendment interests of a client.
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The privilege between the attorney and his client is of ancient
origin. It stands as society's moral choice that confidentiality should
447; In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d at 594. In re GrandJury Proceedings (Gordon), 722 F.2d
303 (8th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as In re Gordon].
The authors of this Article represented Intervenor John Doe in In re Gordon, and
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court in his behalf, No. 83-1309,
denied onJune 11, 1984, 104 S. Ct. 3524 (1984).
3 425 U.S. 391, 404 (1976).
4 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) ("The [fifth amendment] priv-
ilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a convic-
tion under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a
link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.").
5 See supra note 2; see also In re Pavlick, 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982).
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adhere to certain relationships. This choice has been grounded,
moreover, in a practical consideration: "In order to promote free-
dom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of
compelled disclosure by the legal advisors must be removed; hence
the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's con-
sent." 6 Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege has been refined to
apply only to certain situations. The classic formulation, by Judge
Wyzanski, describes it clearly, if in staccato fashion:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is,
or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communica-
tion was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate
and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3)
the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed
(a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the pur-
pose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal serv-
ices or (iii) assistance in some legal proceedings, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been
(a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.7
Necessarily, the invocation of the privilege in a grand jury setting
presupposes the existence and proof of these factors.
One of the earliest cases discussing the theory of the attorney-
client privilege applies with equal force to the modern use of the
privilege. In Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea,8 the Recorder stated the
basic premise of the attorney-client privilege:
Now, if an attorney was to be examined in every case, what man would
trust an attorney with the secret of his estate, if he should be permitted
to offer himself as a witness? If an attorney had it in his option to be
examined, there would be an entire stop to business; nobody would
trust an attorney with the state of his affairs. The reason why attornies
are not to be examined to anything relating to their clients or their
affairs is because they would destroy the confidence that is necessary
to be preserved between them. This confidence between the employer
and the person employed, is so sacred a thing, that if they were at
liberty, when the present cause was over that they were employed in,
to give testimony in favor of any other person, it would not answer the
end for which it was instituted. The end is, that persons with safety may
substitute others in their room; and therefore if you cannot ask me, you cannot ask
that man;for everything said to him, is as if I had said it to myself, and he is not
6 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See also C. MCCORMICK,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 (2d ed. Cleary 1984).
7 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950). See also 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2292, at 554. ("(1) Where legal advice of
any kind is sought, (2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are
at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
advisor, (8) except the protection may be waived.").




This central reason for the existence and scope of the privilege
appears in American jurisprudence as often as it appears in the Eng-
lish authorities. 10 Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts stated as
early as 1833:
This principle we take to be this; that so numerous and complex are
the laws by which the rights and duties of citizens are governed, so
important is it that they should be permitted to avail themselves of the
superior skill and learning of those who are sanctioned by the law as its
ministers and expounders, both in ascertaining their rights in the
country, and maintaining them most safely in courts, without publish-
ing those facts, which they have a right to keep secret, but which must
be disclosed to a legal advisor and advocate, to enable him successfully
to perform the duties of his office, that the law has considered it the
wisest policy to encourage and sanction this confidence, by requiring
that on such facts the mouth of the attorney shall be forever sealed. I 1
And Justice, then Circuit Judge, Brewer eloquently expressed the
controlling principle that guides attorneys and instills confidence
and reliance in clients:
[I]t is the glory of our profession that its fidelity to its client can be
depended on; that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with
him upon his rights in any litigation with the absolute assurance that
that lawyer's tongue is tied from ever disclosing it .... ,,1
These views have been ratified most recently by the Supreme
Court in Fisher v. United States'5 and Upjohn Co. v. United States.' 4 In
Fisher, the Court viewed the matter pragmatically: "As a practical
matter, if the client knows that damaging information could be more
readily obtained from the attorney in the absence of disclosure, the
client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be
difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice."' 5 Upjohn similarly
recognized the importance of the privilege's protection of "full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients."' 6 The
9 Id. at 1225, quoted in 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, §2291 (emphasis added).
10 See, e.g., Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (privilege rests "upon the
necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having
knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and
readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclo-
sure."). See generally Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1087-91 (1978).
11 Hatton v. Robinson, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 416, 422 (1833), quoted in 8J. WIGMORE,
supra note 6, §2291; see also Wade v. Ridley, 87 Me. 368, 373, 32 A. 975, 976 (1895),
quoted in 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, §229 1.
12 United States v. Costen, 38 F. 24, 24 (C.C.D. Colo. 1889).
13 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
14 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
15 425 U.S. at 403.
16 449 U.S. at 389.
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Court went far to reaffirm the protections created by the privilege
and their centrality in the relations between lawyer and client. 17
Without full information, and without the guarantee of absolute
confidence that the attorney-client privilege engenders in every cli-
ent, an attorney will find it impossible to fulfill his duty of represen-
tation. This, as Fisher and Upjohn both teach, is recognized by the
courts in construing the privilege, and it is this vital interest of both
attorneys and clients that is threatened by recent court rulings re-
quiring revelation of the client's identity by his attorney before a
grand jury. 1 8
It is the historic judgment of the common law, as it apparently is of
European law and is generally in western society, that whatever handi-
capping of the adjudicatory process is caused by recognition of the
privileges, it is not too great a price to pay for secrecy in certain com-
municative relations ...
Therefore, to conceive of the privileges merely as exclusionary
rules, is to start out on the wrong road and, except by happy accident,
to reach the wrong destination. They are, or rather by the chance of
litigation may become, exclusionary rules; but this is incidental and
secondary. Primarily they are a right to be let alone, a right to unfet-
tered freedom, in certain narrowly prescribed relationships, from the
state's coercive or supervisory powers and from the nuisance of its
eavesdropping. 19
The recent court decisions dealing with the identity exclusion 20
to the attorney-client privilege generally characterize identity as be-
ing outside the ambit of the privilege, and unworthy of the protec-
tion of this "exclusionary rule," without regard to the client's intent
or interests. In so doing, the importance of the privilege is dero-
gated and the search for evidence magnified in a manner suggesting
that the protection of the privilege may fall away even where it is
most urgently needed.
17 The Court recognized in Upjohn that the "control group" test enunciated by the
Sixth Circuit, in its decision below, 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (1980), "frustrates the very
purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by
employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corpora-
tion." Id. at 392.
18 See supra note 2.
19 Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31
TUL. L. REV. 101, 110-11 (1956).
20 Though the courts refer to this as an "exception" to the privilege, we view this as
an awkward and incorrect characterization. It is more properly termed as an exclusion
because identity generally is considered outside the privilege. Those doctrines, see infra
notes 48-97 and accompanying text, that allow the privilege to apply to identity may be
considered exceptions to this exclusion.
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III. INTERVENTION BY THE CLIENT
An attorney faced with an order compelling him to identify, and
possibly incriminate, his client before the grand jury is in a painful
dilemma. He must either comply with the court's order, violating
his client's confidence, or he must risk contempt, and possibly jail,
in his attempt to vindicate his client's privilege. There is, however,
an alternate approach.
It is established law that an order compelling testimony or de-
nying a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena is not appealable. 21
The party opposing the order must either comply with its dictates,
or refuse to do so and invite a contempt citation. Only after an or-
der imposing contempt is entered does the matter then become sub-
ject to appellate review. An exception to this somewhat draconian
rule is recognized when the party seeking review has a more direct
interest in preventing disclosure of the information sought by the
grand jury than the individual to whom the subpoena was directed
does in preventing disclosure. 22 This exception, known as the Perl-
man exception, recognizes that the individual functioning under a
court order which compels his testimony may well comply volunta-
rily with that order, and deprive the real party in interest of his pro-
tected right and the opportunity for appellate review of his claims.23
In the context of a client seeking immediate review of an order
compelling testimony from his attorney, the federal courts of ap-
peals have split upon the applicability of the Perlman exception. 24
21 See, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States,
309 U.S. 323 (1940); Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117 (1906).
22 Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
23 Nevertheless, a recent decision by the Supreme Court, holding that a pretrial or-
der of disqualification of defense counsel is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, uses language that raises some doubt as to the survival of this exception. Flana-
gan v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1051, 1054 (1984). It stresses the compelling interest of
prompt criminal trials and the importance of the final judgment rule in refusing to per-
mit piecemeal appellate review except in extremely limited circumstances. Id. at 1054-
56. "The importance of the final judgment rule has led the Court to permit departures
from the rule 'only when observance of it would practically defeat the right to any review
at all.'" Id. at 1055 (citation omitted) (quoting Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.
323, 324-25 (1940)). This would appear to leave open the use of the Perlman exception
as contemplated in this Article inasmuch as the removal of this type of appellate review
would "practically defeat the right to any review at all." Id.
24 The First Circuit and the Circuit for the District of Columbia have denied the ap-
plicability of Perlman, and have held that the order is not immediately appealable. In re
Sealed Case, 655 F.2d 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15, 18 (Ist Cir.
1980) ("An attorney. . . as proof of his own stout-heartedness, might be willing to defy
a testimonial order and run the risk of a contempt proceeding.").
The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have applied Perlman and allowed immediate review. In re Gordon, 722 F.2d 303
(6th Cir. 1983); United States v.Jones, 696 F.2d 1069 (4th Cir. 1982); In re GrandJury
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The majority of circuits, however, do allow immediate appellate re-
view. 25 The rationale permitting review is well articulated by the
Fifth Circuit's decision in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine):
We suspect that the willingness of a lawyer to protect a client's privi-
lege in the face of a contempt citation will vary greatly, and have a
direct relationship to the value of the client's business and the power
of the client in relation to the attorney. We are reluctant to pin the
appealability of a district court order upon such precarious considera-
tions ....
Although we cannot say that attorneys in general are more or less
likely to submit to a contempt citation rather than violate a client's
confidence, we can say without reservation that some significant
number of client-intervenorscmight find themselves denied all mean-
ingful appeal by attorneys unwilling to make such a sacrifice. That se-
rious consequence is enough to justify a holding that a client-
intervenor may appeal an order compelling testimony from the client's
attorney. 26
Assuming no change in the law as a result of Flanagan,27 the
procedure that is therefore available to a client whose attorney has
been ordered to identify him to the grand jury is to intervene as a
"John Doe" in the matter and seek appellate review of the trial
court's order. This manner of clients asserting their rights is avail-
able in all but two circuits and it provides clients and attorneys with
a powerful tool to vindicate their reliance upon the privilege.28
IV. THE IDENTITY EXCLUSION
The general rule under the attorney-client privilege is well-rec-
ognized: the identity of the client is not privileged and therefore
may be compelled from the attorney in testimony before the grand
Subpoenas (Lahodny), 695 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as In re Lahodny];
In re GrandJury Proceedings (Damore), 689 F.2d 1351 (11th Cir. 1982); In re GrandJury
Proceedings (Fine), 641 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ma-
lone), 655 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1981); In re 1979 Grand Jury, 616 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir.
1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979).
25 See supra note 24 and cases cited therein.
26 641 F.2d 199, 202-03.
27 104 S. Ct. at 1054; see supra note 23.
28 See supra note 24 and cases cited therein. As a practical matter, the attorney for the
intervening client should prepare an affidavit by the intervening client, to be submitted
in camera. The affidavit should recite the identity of a client, the existence of the attor-
ney-client privilege between the client and subpoenaed attorney, trackingJudge Wyzan-
ski's formula, supra note 7 and accompanying text, to establish for the trial court the
existence of the privilege. It should note that the client specifically claims the privilege
and, in order to ensure that his attorney does not reveal privileged information, wishes
to intervene in the matter. Such an affidavit submitted in camera and in conjunction with
a motion to intervene on behalf of this client should be sufficient to effectuate an inter-
vention that would allow immediate protection for the client from the attorney's being
held in contempt and subsequently revealing a privileged communication.
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jury.2 9 The rule seems to be rooted in three notions.
First, in order to create an attorney-client relationship in which
communications are protected, the attorney must necessarily know
the identity of the client. Because the client's identity predates and
presupposes the relationship, however, it is not a communication
protected by an existing privilege.30
Second, because protection of client identity is not a justifiable
concern of civil litigation it should also not be of concern in the
criminal arena. Dean Wigmore's treatise, often quoted by the
courts, 3 1 states:
The identity of the attorney's client ... will seldom be a matter
communicated in confidence because the procedure of litigation ordi-
narily presupposes a disclosure of these facts. Furthermore, so far as a
client may in fact desire secrecy and may be able to secure action with-
out appearing as a party to the proceedings, it would be improper to
sanction such a wish. Every litigant is in justice entitled to know the
identity of his opponents.3 2
Third, because the privilege necessarily impedes the search for
truth and frustrates the administration ofjustice, and because iden-
tity does not appear to be a protected communication, the privilege
should be narrowly drawn so as to exclude identity from
protection.33
29 See Behrens v. Hironimus, 170 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1948); C. McCoRMaiCK, supra note
6, at § 90; 97 CJ.S. Witnesses § 283(e) (1957). The same rule, often enumerated in tan-
dem, holds true for fee arrangements. This Article, however, will not address that sepa-
rate area, though many of the approaches discussed have application to fees as well.
30 See, e.g., In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d at 592; Behrens, 170 F.2d at 628; People ex rel.
Vogelstein v. Warden of County Jail, 150 Misc. 714, 718, 270 N.Y.S. 362, 367 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 242 A.D. 611, 271 N.Y.S. 1059 (N.Y. App. Div. 1934) ("The mere fact of
the engagement of counsel is out of the rule because the privilege and duty of being
silent do not arise until that fact is ascertained.").
31 See, e.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962); Baird v. Koer-
ner, 279 F.2d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 1960); Gretsky v. Miller, 160 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D.
Mass. 1958).
32 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2313, at 609.
33 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403 ("[S]ince the privilege has the effect of withholding rele-
vant information from the fact-finder, it applies only where necessary to achieve its pur-
pose."); In re Jones, 517 F.2d at 671-72 ("IT]he purpose of the privilege-to suppress
truth-runs counter to the dominant aims of the law."); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d
778, 783 (2d Cir. 1944) ("[W]hen the narrow exclusionary rule ceases to apply, then the
more general and pervasive rule of free disclosure to ascertain the truth and prevent the
guilty from escaping furnishes the governing principle."); Mauch v. Comm'r, 113 F.2d
555 (3d Cir. 1940) (attorney charged with tax evasion asserted that client's funds were
commingled with his and were not unreported income; court required identification of
client when attorney used privilege to refuse to furnish client's identity); United States v.
Lee, 107 F. 702, 704 (C.C. E.D.N.Y. 1901) (identity of client required to prove existence
of client whose privilege attorney asserts); People ex. reL Vogelstein, 150 Misc. at 718, 720
(client must be named to prove existence of relationship; privilege must be confined
within narrowest possible limits).
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These notions have been articulated in various contexts in the
early cases,3 4 and have provided the basis for later holdings that
identity is not protected by the privilege. Those holdings, but not
the notions underlying them, have been uncritically adopted over
the years so that there now exists a large body of precedent that
states, with little exception, that the privilege does not protect client
identity. 35 Insofar as these cases merely accept prior holdings with-
out examining their foundations,3 6 however, they fail to address ba-
sic flaws in the notions that gave rise to the identity exclusion. And,
it may be argued, that if the existence of the identity exclusion were
to be weighed today, de novo and without the baggage of precedent,
the important purpose of an inviolable attorney-client privilege37
would outweigh the inherited rationales of the past.
The first notion, that the client's identity is not protected be-
cause it presupposes the creation of the relationship, and the privi-
lege only protects communications within the relationship,3 8 exalts
form over substance. It is, of course, a truism that a client cannot
create a relationship without revealing some aspect of the client's
identity, but it is illogical to suppose that the communication of
identity must always be outside the privilege simply because it must,
for however short a time, precede the formation of a relationship.
The necessity of having to create a relationship should not preclude
the relationship's protection of that which is central to its creation.
The critical inquiry in examining the applicability of the privilege
34 See supra notes 31 and 33.
35 See generally In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d at 592; In re Durant, 723 F.2d at 451-52; In
re Grand Jury Proceedings in Matter of Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571 (11 th Cir. 1983); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Twist), 689 F.2d 1351 (11 th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as In
re Twist]; In re Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1027; In re Walsh, 823 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 1980);
In re Semel, 411 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 905 (1969); In re Lahodny,
695 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1982); In re GrandJury Witness (Salas & Waxman), 695 F.2d 359
(9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as In re Salas & Waxman]; In re Grand Jury Investiga-
tion (Tinari), 631 F.2d 17 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1980); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Strahl, 590 F.2d
10 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977); In
re Jones, 517 F.2d at 670 n.2 (collected cases); United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248
(7th Cir. 1975); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965); Colton v. United
States, 308 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); United States v.
Pape, 144 F.2d 778 (1944), and cases cited therein.
36 See, e.g., In re Slaughter, 694 F.2d 1258 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Twist, 889 F.2d at
1352.
37 See supra notes 6-20 and accompanying text. This should not be interpreted to
suggest that the authors advocate a privilege that protects future criminal or fraudulent
behavior, but rather a privilege consonant with the spirit of protected communications
and one that does not countenance an attorney's incrimination of his own client before
the grand jury.
38 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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should address whether the purpose of the privilege is served, not
whether the formation of the relationship occurred one second after
revelation of identity.
In most circumstances, the client's identity is not intended to be
secret. But where the client's identity is crucial to the legal advice
sought, it surely defeats the very purpose of the privilege not to pro-
tect that which gave rise to the relationship. In circumstances where
advice is sought for a past crime, or regarding transactions that are
later under investigation, and a trail of evidence leads to an attor-
ney, it is clearly repugnant to the basis of the privilege to require the
attorney to help indict his own client. It is in these circumstances,
where the prerequisites of the privilege are met, and the attorney is
asked to link illegal or suspect acts with his as-yet-undiscovered cli-
ent, that the protections of the privilege ought to attach, and the
client's identity ought to be considered a protected communication.
Rulings that identity is not protected because it was known
before the existence of the relationship make form everything and
substance nothing. Neither logic nor the concerns of the privilege
support such a notion, and reliance upon it, through repetition of
precedent, is misplaced.
Similarly, citation to Wigmore's discussion on client identity,39
as support for its exclusion from the ambit of the privilege in crimi-
nal or grand jury settings, fails to recognize that Dean Wigmore
there spoke purely about identity in the context of civil litigation.
He stated that, "the procedure of litigation ordinarily presupposes a
disclosure of [the client's identity]," 40 noting that "[e]very litigant is
. ..entitled to know the identity of his opponents."' 4 ' This is indis-
putable in a civil context. It does not hold true, however, in a grand
jury setting where a client has not initiated litigation "without ap-
pearing as a party to the proceedings, ' 42 and does not have oppo-
nents. The purpose of the privilege, again, must be that which is
addressed. Where it appears that protection of identity serves to
foster the goals of the privilege, as it clearly does in a grand jury
context, then a notion imported from civil litigation simply is inap-
posite, and the indirect use of this notion to force attorneys to iden-
tify their clients is unsupportable.
Finally, the third notion underlying the exclusion states the
conclusion of a balancing test that excludes identity from protection
because the privilege impedes the search for truth. This presup-
39 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.





poses a low value for protecting identity and a high value for unfet-
tered grand jury investigation. 43 Yet the real question that must be
confronted is whether any particular case warrants denial of the privi-
lege to identity where such may be inconsistent with the purpose of
the privilege. Fisher's concern that the privilege should apply "only
where necessary to achieve its purpose" 44 should not be construed
to exclude identity from its scope.
The balance between the search for truth and the application of
the attorney-client privilege must recognize the necessity of vindi-
cating the purpose of the privilege.45 If that balance is properly
struck, then the value of protecting identity in appropriate settings
outweighs other considerations.
It must, however, be recognized that these re-evaluations of the
bases of the identity exclusion have not been considered by the
courts, Rather, the courts have acknowledged, on a piecemeal basis,
that there are significant difficulties with a general rule excluding
identity. Accordingly, there have been promulgated at least three
exceptions to the rule of exclusion 46 and there now exists at least
one conflict among the circuits as to the applicability of these
exceptions. 47
V. EXCEPTIONS TO THE IDENTITY EXCLUSION
The courts have stated several exceptions to the rule excluding
client identity from the protection of the attorney-client privilege.48
The modern discussion of these exceptions starts from the Ninth
Circuit's seminal decision in Baird v. Koerner.49
Baird involved a claim of privilege regarding the identity of a
client-attorney, who himself represented certain taxpayers and had not
43 See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 685, 686-87 (1972).
44 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403.
45 "Throughout their judicial endeavors courts seek truth and justice and their
search is aided significantly by the fundamental principle of full disclosure. When that
principle conflicts with the attorney-client privilege it must, of course, give way, but only to the extent
necessary to vindicate the privilege and its underlying purposes. The matter is truly one of balance."
In re Richardson, 31 N.J. 391, 401, 157 A.2d 695, 701 (1960) (emphasis supplied).
46 See In re Pavlick, 880 F.2d at 1027-29; Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 665-66
(7th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965); Baird, 279 F.2d at 631-
32.
47 See In re Durant, 723 F.2d at 453-54 (rejecting exception stated by Fifth Circuit in
In re Pavlick); In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591 (rejecting former Ninth Circuit exception
now adopted by First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits). See also infra
text accompanying notes 132-53.
48 See supra note 46.
49 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
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revealed their identities to Baird. Baird, a tax lawyer, had been asked
by this client-attorney to evaluate the tax position of the undisclosed
taxpayers and to recommend a course of action. He determined
that the existing tax deficiencies should be paid to the Treasury, and
to that effect he sent to the Internal Revenue Service a check repre-
senting the unpaid taxes and interest. The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice thereupon issued him a subpoena and required him to identify
the attorney, accountants, and taxpayers involved. Baird refused to
divulge the identities of the attorney and accountants and, upon a
hearing on the subsequent order to show cause, Baird was held in
civil contempt.50
Upon review, the Ninth Circuit applied California law51 which
recognized an exception for identity cases:
The name of the client will be considered privileged matter where
the circumstances of the case are such that the name of the client is
material only for the purpose of showing an acknowledgment of guilt
on the part of such client of the very offenses on account of which the
attorney was employed .... 52
In addition, the court noted that disclosure of the identity "may well
be the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to con-
vict an individual of a federal crime." 53
The Baird court considered and categorically rejected the civil
litigation notion from Wigmore that absolutely excluded identity
from the scope of the privilege.54 Moreover, the court held that
communications made prior to the retention of counsel, including the
name of the client, fell within the privilege as certainly as those com-
munications made after employment.55 Importantly, Baird con-
cluded that "there is no federal body of law that requires the
exclusion of the identity of the client from the extent of the attor-
ney-client privilege.. . . [I]t must be assessed on a case to case ba-
sis, depending on the particular facts of each case." 56
Numerous cases have drawn upon Baird's recognition that there
50 Id. at 625-27.
51 Id. at 632-33 (construing Exparte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566 (1915)).
52 Baird, 279 F.2d at 633 (quoting 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 283(e)).
53 Id. (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951)).
54 Id. at 630-31 ("But here no litigation exists. The taxpayers have sought no judi-
cial determination of the correctness of the amount paid ... "); see supra notes 39-42
and accompanying text.
55 Id. at 635; see 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2304 (client-to-be must be protected
in his preliminary statements).
56 Id. at 631. The court came to this conclusion after a review of state and federal
cases. The principle of case by case adjudication is universally accepted. See, e.g. ,Jones,




should be exceptions to the rule of exclusion, and three distinct off-
shoots are now recognized.
A. THE "LEGAL ADVICE" EXCEPTION
The "legal advice" exception stems directly from Baird.57 The
Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Hodge and Zweig, restated the excep-
tion as follows:
The general rule, however, is qualified by an important exception:
A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may
be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a
strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would im-
plicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice
was sought.58
This articulation of the exception has been adopted by the First,59
Third,60 Fifth, 61 Sixth,62 Seventh,63 and Eleventh64 Courts of Ap-
peals. The Ninth Circuit has generally followed its guidance.6 5
This exception, however, has been limited sharply by a recent
per curiam opinion of a panel of the Ninth Circuit in In re Osterhoudt,66
which has repudiated Hodge and Zweig's articulation of the excep-
tion, 67 and returned to what may be considered the primary, but
certainly not the sole, basis of decision in Baird.68 The Osterhoudt
court rejected prior judicial interpretation of Baird under which the
privilege was applied because there was a strong probability that
disclosure of the client's identity would incriminate him.69
In contrast, Osterhoudt states Baird's principle as allowing appli-
cation of the privilege where the circumstances of the case show that
disclosure of the client's identity would be in substance a disclosure
57 See Baird, 279 F.2d at 633; see also Exparte McDonough, 170 Cal. at 235-37, 149 P.
at 568.
58 548 F.2d at 1353.
59 Strahl, 590 F.2d at 11-12.
60 In re Grand Jury Investigation (Tinari), 631 F.2d at 19.
61 In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine), 641 F.2d at 204.
62 In re Durant, 723 F.2d at 452.
63 In re Walsh, 623 F.2d at 495 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600
F.2d at 218).
64 In re Grand Jury Proceedings in Matter of Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571, 1575-76 (11 th
Cir. 1983).
65 See, e.g., In re Lahodny, 695 F.2d 365; In re Salas & Waxman, 695 F.2d 361-62;
United States v. Sherman, 627 F.2d 189, 190-91 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d at 218.
66 722 F.2d at 593-94.
67 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
68 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. For further discussion and analysis of
the holding in In re Osterhoudt, see infra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
69 722 F.2d at 593.
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of the confidential communication in the professional relationship
between the client and the attorney.70
The Ninth Circuit's limitation of the effect of incrimination on
the availability of the privilege has been accepted only in the Sec-
ond,7' Third72 and Seventh73 Circuits. The adoption of the Hodge
and Zweig articulation of the exception by the remaining other courts
of appeals is presently unaffected. Accordingly, in those remaining
jurisdictions, the identity of the client is still privileged where it can
be demonstrated that disclosure of the client's identity would impli-
cate him in the very activity for which he sought legal advice.
B. THE "SUBSTANTIAL DISCLOSURE" EXCEPTION
A second exception to the rule requiring identification of the
client is what may be called the "substantial disclosure exception."
This exception applies when there has already been so substantial a
disclosure of the client's confidential communications that to re-
quire his identity as well would be to require disclosure of a confi-
dential communication.7 4
The Baird court understood that a client's identity could well be
comprehended within a "privileged communication" and that, ab-
sent specific and recognized factors militating against extending the
privilege,75 the client's identity ought to fall within it where neces-
sary: "If the identification of the client conveys information which
ordinarily would be conceded to be part of the usual privileged
communication between attorney and client, then the privilege
should extend to such identification in the absence of other
factors."'76
Following Baird, the Fourth Circuit in NLRB v. Harvey77 stated
the exception as follows: "To the general rule is an exception,
firmly bedded as the rule itself. The privilege may be recognized
when so much of the actual communication has already been dis-
70 Id. at 593-94. But cf. Harvey, 349 F.2d at 905 (quaere how In re Osterhoudt differs
from Harvey's separate exception); see infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
71 In re Shargel, 742 F.2d at 62-63.
72 Liebman, 742 F.2d at 810.
73 In re March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d at 494.
74 See Harvey, 349 F.2d at 905.
75 "Such factors are (a) the commencing of litigation on behalf of the client where he
voluntarily subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the court; (b) an identification relating
to an employment by some third person, not the client nor his agent; (c) an employment
of an attorney with respect to future criminal or fraudulent transactions; (d) the attorney
himself being a defendant in a criminal matter." Baird, 279 F.2d at 832 (emphasis in
original).
76 Id.
77 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965).
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closed that identification of the client amounts to disclosure of a
confidential communication."78
This exception is recognized by the First,79 Second,80 Third,8 '
Sixth,8 2 and Seventh83 Courts of Appeals. It has, moreover, been
modified and broadened by the Seventh Circuit's opinion in United
States v. Jeffers:
"The privilege may be recognized when so much of the actual com-
munication has already been disclosed [not necessarily by the attor-
ney, but by independent sources as well] that identification of the
client [or of fees paid] amounts to disclosure of a confidential
communication." 8 4
Use of this exception could bring identity within the privilege
where, by whatever manner, a communication between lawyer and
client has been divulged, and all that would be needed to lay bare
the whole communication would be the client's identity.
Similarly, the privilege could be claimed when actions resulting
from the client's directions to the attorney are traced to the attorney
and he is compelled to link the actions with his undiscovered client.
Assuming that the acts were not in furtherance of a criminal or
fraudulent scheme,8 5 and that they related to the client's motive for
the representation, disclosure of the client's identity would convey
the entire substance of his confidential communication with, and di-
rections to, his attorney. This protection should also apply to a
communication made in anticipation of employment.86
C. THE "LAST LINK" EXCEPTION
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick),8 7 the Fifth Circuit, en
banc, articulated "a limited and narrow exception to the general
78 Id. at 905.
79 Strahl, 590 F.2d at 11.
80 Colton, 306 F.2d at 637.
81 In re Grand Jury Empanelled February 14, 1978 (Markowitz), 603 F.2d 469, 473
(3d Cir. 1979) (emphasizing confidential communication rather than incrimination as
triggering privilege); see also United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1984).
82 In re Durant, 723 F.2d at 453.
83 United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 1975); see also Tillotson, 350
F.2d at 666.
84 532 F.2d 1101, 1115 (7th Cir. 1976).
85 Acts in furtherance of a criminal or fraudulent scheme would trigger the crime or
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, thus obviating any protection that might
have originally applied. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); In re Pavlick,
680 F.2d at 1028-29; Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d at 1354; United States v. Friedman, 445
F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1981); 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2298.
86 See supra note 55; see also Baird, 279 F.2d at 635.
87 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982).
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rule" that identity is not protected.a8 The exception obtains "when
the disclosure of the client's identity by his attorney would have supplied the last
link in an existing chain of incriminating evidence likely to lead to the client's
indictment."8 9 At present, only the Eleventh Circuit has adopted this
exception, 90 and the Sixth Circuit has expressly rejected it.91 Fur-
thermore, the Seventh Circuit rejected any reliance upon an incrimi-
nation rationale in a case dealing with disclosure of fee
information. 92
Though Pavlick's concern with the possibility of incrimination
hearkens to its predecessor case, In re Grand Jury Proceedings Uones),93
the Pavlick majority misreadJones' rule of exception, thereby signifi-
candy reducing the availability of the exception. 94 The possibility of
an attorney incriminating his client is evident in the articulation of
the "last link" exception, but having narrowed the exception's scope
to that of the "last link in an existing chain of incriminating evi-
dence," 95 In re Pavlick also acts to defeat any purpose served by the
concept of incrimination in the exception. As one commentator has
already noted:
[Ihe last link-analysis creates the problem of defining what the last
link is .... Furthermore, the 'last link' test gives prosecutors the in-
centive to start their investigations with the defense attorney. By call-
ing attorneys to testify early, the prosecutors could force the attorneys
to reveal their client's identities before the identities provide the last
link. . . . Thus, the 'last link' test. . . creates undesirable incentives
88 Id. at 1027. Although the In re Pavlick court characterizes this exception as having
arisen in In re GrandJury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975), the excep-
tion promulgated in In reJones was far more protective of the attorney-client privilege
than the Pavlick statement. In rejones held, in the circumstances of unquestionable in-
crimination of the clients, that:
Just as the client's verbal communications are protected, it follows that other infor-
mation, not normally privileged, should also be protected when so much of the sub-
stance of the communications is already in the government's possession that additional disclosures
would yield substantially probative links in an existing chain of inculpatory events or
transactions."
Id. at 674 (emphasis added).
89 Id. (emphasis added). It may readily be seen thatJones adopts the Harvey "substan-
tial disclosure" exception, see supra note 77 and accompanying text, but modifies it to
include the concept of preventing incrimination of clients by their own lawyers. It also is
obvious that the "substantially probative links" standard is far easier to meet in order to
avoid disclosure than one which requires disclosure of the client's identity to constitute
"the last link."
90 In re Twist, 689 F.2d at 1352-53; In re Slaughter, 694 F.2d at 1260.
91 In re Durant, 723 F.2d at 453-54. For further discussion, see infra notes 150-57 and
accompanying text.
92 In re March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d at 494-95.
93 517 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1975).
94 See supra note 89.
95 680 F.2d at 1027.
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for the prosecutor to subpoena defense attorneys at an early stage of a
criminal investigation.96
Although incrimination is the basis of the "last link" exception,
therefore, its protection is so narrow and the opportunities to avoid
it so many that it fails to effect the purpose of the privilege in other
than the most egregious factual situations. Pavlick, accordingly,
states only a half-hearted attempt to protect against incrimination of
the client by the lawyer.
VI. RECENT DECISIONS
Until December of 1983, In re Pavlick, Harvey, Hodge and Zweig
and Baird dominated the landscape in the area of the identity exclu-
sion. Yet, just as Pavlick's appearance in 1982 reshaped concerns
about the incrimination of a client by his attorney, 97 six recent
cases98 narrow still further a client's access to the "limited and
rarely available sanctuary" 99 of the three exceptions to the general
rule. Although United States v. Liebman'00 sustained the invocation of
the privilege in circumstances similar to Baird, In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena Duces Tecum (Shargel),1° 1 In Matter of Witnesses Before Special
March 1980 GrandJury (March 1980 Grand Jury),10 2 In re Osterhoudt,l03
In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35 (Durant),10 4 and In re Grand
Jury Proceedings-Gordon'0 5 have each eroded something from the
protections of the attorney-client privilege in this area, and their cu-
mulative effect may yet preclude any resort to the sanctuary of the
privilege.
96 Comment, Prosecution's Best Witnesses, supra note 1, at 91-92 (emphasis in original).
97 See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text. In re Pavlick's unnecessary narrow-
ing of Jones' "substantially probative links" test to the difficult-to-envision "last link"
analysis, see supra note 96 and accompanying text, was not even required in view of the
majority's holding that Pavlick's retention as counsel fell within the crime or fraud ex-
ception to the attorney-client privilege. See supra note 85. Moreover, Judge Politz' elo-
quent dissent, 680 F.2d at 1031-34, points out all too clearly how In re Pavlick's "natural
consequence [is] defense counsel becoming the government's unwilling instrument for
the investigation and prosecution of clients forpast criminal acts." Id. at 1034 (emphasis
in original). As he notes, the majority's "invasion, indeed destruction, of the attorney-
client privilege [is] unfortunate, unwarranted, and unwise." Id. at 1032.
98 See Liebman, 742 F.2d 807; In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61; In re March 1980 GrandJury,
729 F.2d 489; In re Durant, 723 F.2d 447; In re Gordon, 722 F.2d 303; In re Osterhoudt,
722 F.2d 591.
99 In re Jones, 517 F.2d at 871.
100 742 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1984).
101 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
102 729 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984).
103 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1983).
104 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983).
105 722 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983).
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A. UNITED STATES V. LIEBMAN
In this case, the Third Circuit sustained the protection of the
attorney-client privilege in circumstances highly reminiscent of
Baird, yet in doing so it relied exclusively upon the "substantial dis-
closure exception" articulated in Harvey and its progeny. 106
The sole issue of the case was whether the privilege protected
from disclosure the identity of clients who deducted legal fees for
tax advice on their income tax return. The IRS had contended that
,the fees for Liebman's services were not tax deductible because the
type of service rendered was not "legal," making the fee a non-de-
ductible brokerage charge. The IRS sought to compel Liebman and
his law firm to disclose the identities of clients who paid such fees in
connection with the acquisition of real estate partnership interests
in specified years.' 0 7
The Liebman court determined that the specificity of the sum-
mons-which identified every matter dealing with the clients' rela-
tionship except their names-placed the request squarely within the
"substantial disclosure exception."' 08 It recognized that the issue
was "not the mere disclosure of the act of retaining a lawyer, a fact
not normally privileged, but the disclosure of a substantial confiden-
tial communication."' 109 Because disclosure of the clients' identities
would invade the privilege's protection of confidential communica-
tions and breach the entire protected communication, the court fol-
lowed Baird's result and sustained the invocation of the privilege."l 0
The court specifically held that Pavlick's "last link" exception was
unnecessary to the decision in view of the finding that there were
protected communications.'11 It accordingly declined either to em-
brace or reject the "last link" exception, although it cited dictum
from a previous decision that militates against acceptance of an in-
crimination rationale." 12
Liebman shows that the "substantial disclosure exception" re-
tains vitality when, as in Baird, the circumstances clearly show that
revelation of identity is tantamount to revealing the entire confiden-
106 349 F.2d at 905. See supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
107 Liebman, 742 F.2d at 808-09.
108 Id. at 808.
109 Id. at 810.
110 Id.
III Id. at 810 n.2.
112 Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Empanelled February 14, 1978 (Markowitz), 603 F.2d
469 (3d Cir. 1979)). The Markowitz court stated in a footnote that "it is the previously
revealed confidence, not the fact of potential criminal prosecution, which accounts for
the privilege." 603 F.2d at 473 n.4.
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tial communication. Nevertheless, as discussed infra,a" 3 the applica-
tion of the "substantial disclosure exception" can be far from
consistent, making difficult any access to the "sanctuary" of the priv-
ilege in the situations where it is most appropriate.
B. IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM (SHARGEL)
In this case, arising from a subpoena for client fee records, the
Second Circuit rejected any reliance upon the attorney-client privi-
lege in circumstances where incrimination of the client is a dan-
ger.' 14 The court strictly construed the limits of the privilege to
encompass "only those confidential communications necessary to
obtain informed legal advice." 1 5 Although the opinion recognized
the historic importance of the privilege and acknowledged the fact
that consultation (and identity) may be a precondition to seeking
legal advice, it nevertheless refused to extend the privilege fur-
ther." 6 And it did so despite its concession that the availability of
legal advice may thereby be limited: "[W]e would be less than can-
did not to concede that the lack of a privilege against disclosure of
the fact of an attorney-client relationship may discourage some per-
sons from seeking legal advice at all.""17
Nevertheless, predicating its rationale regarding the privilege
upon the need to secure informed legal advice, and not upon the
need for the lawyer to stand in the shoes of his client, the In re
Shargel court effectively eviscerated the privilege's protection of
113 See infra notes 160-170 and accompanying text.
114 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
15 Id. at 62.
Shortly before the publication of this Article, the Second Circuit decided In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon John Doe, 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter
referred to as In re Doe]. Relying upon In re Shargel, see text accompanying notes 114-
122, infra, the court determined that the attorney-client privilege did not prevent a sub-
poenaed attorney's disclosure to the grand jury of fee information relating to a client.
Id. at 971 n.3. Nevertheless, in an analysis that centered on the quashing of the grand
jury subpoena because the attorney's testimony might require his later disqualification
under MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979) DR 5-102(B), the court
found that the client's sixth amendment right to counsel of his choice was implicated.
Id. at 972-73. It held that the government must demonstrate, in a preliminary showing,
the relevance and need for the attorney's testimony. Id. at 975. Failure to meet either
prong of this test would cause the subpoena to be quashed, thus obviating any issue of
information disclosure by a client's attorney. Id. In re Doe thus provides a powerful
alternative method-in appropriate cases-for preventing the disclosure of confidences
by counsel when the attorney-client privilege is held inapplicable. Although In re Doe is
beyond the narrow scope of this Article, as it provides a new area to be examined by
students of grand jury activity, its potential importance in preventing improper attorney
testimony should not be overlooked.
116 742 F.2d at 63-64.
117 Id. at 63.
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identity in the Second Circuit, leaving as cold comfort the undefined
concession that "[w]e of course continue to recognize that 'there
may be circumstances under which the identification of a client may
amount to the prejudicial disclosure of a confidential communica-
tion ... .'Il Those circumstances are not defined, and it may
therefore be considered as a statement by the court that ad hoc de-
terminations, possibly based upon a narrow "legal advice excep-
tion" or, perhaps, a "substantial disclosure exception," will be the
rule.
An evident concern of Shargel and one that would seem to be
comprehended in Judge Wyzanski's formulation of the privilege 19
is the Second Circuit's fear that extending the privilege would "be-
come an immunity for corrupt or criminal acts."' 120 If that is under-
stood to be the underlying rationale for rejecting the historic
protections of the privilege,12 1 then the Shargel decision does not
respond to the privilege's protections as much as it addresses a per-
ceived problem on the part of defense counsel. It may readily be
seen that reducing the ambit of the privilege to correct perceived
behavior does little, if nothing, to effectuate a client's fifth amend-
ment right under Fisher not to be incriminated by his own lawyer.
The privilege is simply inapplicable ab initio if it is invoked for the
purpose of committing a crime or fraud. 122 Limiting the privilege
further in circumstances when it does not exist anyway does nothing
but destroy the privilege in circumstances where its protections are,
or should be, warranted.
C. IN RE WITNESSES BEFORE THE SPECIAL MARCH 1980 GRAND JURY
The Seventh Circuit in this case reversed the district court's rul-
ing that fee information fell within the privilege because it was a link
in a claim of evidence which might incriminate the client.123 In so
doing, the court determined that two rationales were the predicate
for reliance upon the privilege: confidential communications and
incrimination. 124 The court held that the possibility of incrimination
did not implicate confidential communications and thus was not a
basis for invocation of the privilege. 125 In reaching that conclusion,
118 Id. at 63 (quoting Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d at 637).
119 See supra text accompanying note 7.
120 742 F.2d at 64.
121 See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text.
122 See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also In re Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1028-29.
123 729 F.2d at 490.
124 Id. at 491.
125 Id. at 494-96.
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the court collapsed Fisher's analysis and concluded that the Supreme
Court "focused only on the protection of confidential communica-
tions." 126 That conclusion having been reached (it is submitted,
wrongly), the result is almost pre-ordained. The Seventh Circuit
thus narrows the privilege to include fee information or client iden-
tity only where "its disclosure would result in the disclosure of con-
fidential communications." 127
The opinion reanalyzes Baird128 and In re Grand Jury Proceedings
Uones)' 29 to discover how confidential communications were pro-
tected, and it goes so far as to conclude, contrary to the decision of a
majority of the Fifth Circuit,130 that In rejones was based upon confi-
dential communications and not incrimination. 13 The purpose of
the privilege is thus redefined, both historically and by an incorrect
reading of Fisher, to narrow its scope and exclude a rationale of in-
crimination. This of course limits recourse to the privilege except in
circumstances, rare as those may be, where the client's identity was
clearly expressed as a confidential communication or where the
"substantial disclosure exception" applies.
D. IN RE OSTERHOUDT
In this case dealing with the disclosure of fee arrangements in
the context of possible income tax violations by the client, the Ninth
Circuit returned to the first notion underpinning the identity exclu-
sion in the early cases. 132 It summarily dismissed the idea that fee
arrangements could be privileged "because such information ordi-
narily reveals no confidential professional communication."' 133 Fur-
thermore, the Osterhoudt panel stated that United States v. Hodge and
Zweig134 and its progeny's 135 statement of the Baird exception was
incorrect because it comprehended questions of incrimination and
126 Id. at 491-92 (construing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403).
127 Id. at 492. The opinion does, however, still endorse Harvey's "substantial disclo-
sure exception." Id. at 494.
128 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
129 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
130 In re Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1027.
131 729 F.2d at 493. The opinion does concede that revelation of identity is more
likely to reveal confidences than is fee information. Id. at 494.
132 See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text. (Identity, fact of retention, and fee
arrangements are all preliminary to existence of attorney-client relationship and there-
fore are not protected). See, e.g., Chirac v. Reinicker, I 1 Wheat. (24 U.S.) 280, 6 L.Ed.
474 (1826) (Story, J.).
133 722 F.2d at 593.
134 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977).
135 See, e.g., In re Lahodny, 695 F.2d at 365; In re Salas & Waxman, 695 F.2d at 361-62;
Sherman, 627 F.2d at 190-91; In re Lawson, 600 F.2d at 218.
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did not focus solely on whether disclosure of the client's identity
was a confidential communication.13 6 Retreating from Baird's
broader statement, 3 7 the panel held:
The principle of Baird was not that the privilege applied because the
identity of the client was incriminating, but because in the circum-
stances of the case disclosure of the identity of the client was in sub-
stance a disclosure of the confidential communication in the
professional relationship between the client and the attorney.' 38
The court quoted from Baird, implying thatthe sole basis of decision
was as follows:
The name of the client will be considered privileged matter where
the circumstances of the case are such that the name of the client is
material only for the purpose of showing an acknowledgement of guilt on
the part of such client of the very offense on account of which the
attorney was employed. .... 139
In so doing, the Osterhoudt panel significantly reduced the availability
of the Hodge and Zweig exception 140 and foreclosed even the oppor-
tunity to show how fee information (or identity) could constitute a
privileged communication.
Indeed, Osterhoudt's narrow reading of Baird is contrary to
readings of previous panels of the Ninth Circuit,' 4 ' as well as other
courts of appeals in Harvey,142 In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones),143
and In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick). 4 4 Though Baird relied heav-
ily upon the communication of the client's identity as an acknowl-
edgement of guilt, the court also balanced the public benefit of
disclosure "against the sacredness of the attorney's obligation to
keep inviolate the secrecy of the client's confidence."'' 45 In addi-
tion, the Baird court considered the applicability of the privilege; the
fact that this was not a civil suit instituted by the client; that there
was no reference to future criminal or fraudulent conduct; and
whether the attorney raised the privilege to protect himself from
136 722 F.2d at 593.
137 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
138 722 F.2d at 593.
139 Id. (quoting Baird, 279 F.2d at 633, and 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 283(e), at 803) (em-
phasis added in In re Osterhoudt).
140 See generally In re Salas & Waxman, 695 F.2d at 362 (leaving open the possibility
that requested information would implicate clients in the very activity for which they
sought legal advice).
141 See, e.g., In re Lahodny, 695 F.2d at 365; In re Salas & Waxman, 695 F.2d at 361-62;
Sherman, 627 F.2d at 190-91; In re Lawson, 600 F.2d at 218.
142 349 F.2d at 905.
143 517 F.2d at 671-72.
144 680 F.2d at 1027; see supra notes 65, 74, 88 and accompanying text.




Most importantly, the court in Baird acknowledged that compel-
ling Baird to divulge his client's identity could "well be the link that
could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual
of a federal crime." 147 This anticipates Fisher's dictum, quoting
Wigmore, that the attorney-client privilege protects documents (or
testimony) of the client in the hands of the attorney when the client
himself would have a fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. 148 This understanding, that the client's fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination allows invocation of the attor-
ney-client privilege, is the basis underlying the decisions in Hodge
and Zweig, In rejones and Pavlick.149
The Osterhoudt court's failure to recognize these precepts of
Baird and Hodge and Zweig along with its narrow focus excluding in-
crimination as a basis for invoking the privilege, therefore, presages
significant erosion in the protections of the attorney-client privilege.
E. IN RE GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION NO. 83-2-35 (DURANT)
In Durant, the Sixth Circuit addressed the identity question in a
context where, "[i]n effect, the identity of Durant's client was the
last link of evidence necessary to effect an indictment."15 0 In that
case, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in investigating a
scheme whereby checks made payable to and stolen from Interna-
tional Business Machines, Inc. (IBM) were deposited into various
bank accounts opened in the names of fictitious organizations, dis-
covered that a check, drawn upon one of the bank accounts, was
made payable to Richard Durant's law firm. Durant was subpoenaed
before the grand jury where he asserted the attorney-client privilege
on behalf of his client. The government then procured a hearing in
which the district court held that the privilege did not attach, order-
ing Durant to testify. Durant refused to comply with the court's or-
146 Id. at 634.
147 Id. at 633 (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951)).
148 425 U.S. at 404 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2307).
149 See supra text accompanying notes 67-70 and 87-96.
150 723 F.2d at 449. Durant's unchallenged testimony recited a statement by a Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation agent that "as soon as we get the name of that client, we are
going to arrest the client .... ." Id. at 449 n.2. Further, when Durant rejected the
government's suggestion that he reveal the client's identity and not inform him, presum-
ably to give the FBI time to effect his arrest, the government agent indicated that they
could get time by [fingerlprinting Durant and holding him incommunicado for six or
seven hours. Id. at 449-50 n.3. Durant countered by telling the agent that his office had
instructions to appear in court with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus if he had not
returned by a certain time.
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der and was held in contempt.151
In passing upon the applicability of the privilege, the Sixth Cir-
cuit reviewed the state of the law in this .area since Baird and ad-
dressed each of the three exceptions to the identity exclusion. 152
While conceding that Durant's position fell squarely within the Pay-
lick "last link" exception, and recognizing the viability of the "legal
advice" and the "substantial disclosure" exceptions, 153 the court
concluded that the "last link" exception should be rejected because
it was not grounded in the preservation of confidential communica-
tions and, therefore, was "not justifiable to support the attorney-
client privilege."' 154 Although the court did not limit applicability of
the "legal advice" exception, which Durant claimed,155 it held that
the burden of proving the applicability of the privilege rested on
Durant.156 Because Durant failed to request an in camera ex parte
hearing to adduce evidence supporting his contentions of privilege,
he did not meet his burden.157
It can be observed, therefore, that In re Durant, without knowl-
edge of In re Osterhoudt, nevertheless parallels its approach and hold-
ing. Like the Ninth Circuit in Osterhoudt, Durant has focused solely
on the preservation of confidential communications as the touch-
stone for the privilege. The two cases, therefore, reject the importa-
tion of any concerns regarding incrimination of the client into
determinations of privilege.
F. IN RE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS - GORDON
Gordon,158 handed down almost simultaneously with In re Grand
Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35 (Durant),159 rests in part upon Durant's
151 Id. at 448-49.
152 Id. at 452-54. Because the opinion was handed down three weeks prior to In re
Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1983), the Sixth Circuit did not address the change
in the Ninth Circuit's rule nor its effect on the generally accepted exception.
153 Id. at 452-53; see supra text accompanying notes 87-96.
154 723 F.2d at 454.
155 Id. at 454. It should be noted that the court expressed some doubt as to the con-
sistency of Durant's statements regarding his representation. Id. at 455. At a March 2
hearing, Durant disavowed knowledge of the stolen checks, yet the court points out that
on March 22, when claiming the "legal advice" exception, Durant stated that he had
been engaged for past activity related to stolen IBM checks. Id. This suggests the possi-
bility of an alternate basis of decision.
156 Id. at 454.
157 Id. at 454-455. A petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was filed in the Supreme Court in Durant, No. 83-1468, and
deniedJune 11, 1984, 104 S. Ct. 3524 (1984).
158 722 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983).
159 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983).
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rejection of the "last link" exception1 60 and illustrates the decreas-
ing availability of the privilege.
A grand jury, investigating possible income tax violations of
Reuben Sturman, subpoenaed attorney Larry S. Gordon to testify
regarding twelve corporations incorporated by his law firm and four
other corporations that were his clients. During his testimony,
Gordon acknowledged that Sturman was a client of the firm and was
represented by Gordon. However, when Gordon was asked to tell
the grand jury (1) who requested each incorporation, (2) who pro-
vided shareholder and officer information to the law firm, (3) who
was (were) the agent(s) of the corporations with whom the law firm
dealt regarding legal matters, and (4) who requested and/or re-
ceived custody of corporate records from the law firm, Gordon re-
fused to answer, invoking the attorney-client privilege. 16'
After the government filed a motion to compel Gordon's testi-
mony, a "John Doe" filed a motion to intervene stating that he was
the individual sought by the govemment.1 62 Upon the issuance of
an order compelling Gordon's testimony and allowing intervention,
Doe, as client-intervenor, sought appellate review.
The Sixth Circuit opinion characterizes the four interrogatories
to Gordon as "merely seek[ing] the identity of his client," and then
states the "unanimously embraced" general rule that identity is not
within the privilege. 163 Concurring with the district court's ruling
that the "legal advice" exception was inapplicable, 6 4 the court
turned to the "substantial disclosure exception." With regard to
each of the four inquiries the Court cursorily concluded that none of
them amounted to a confidential communication in the context of
prior disclosures. 165
The court held that the identity of the client who requested in-
corporation "merely amount[ed] to a disclosure of the scope and
objective of the legal employment undertaken by Gordon," which is
not subject to privilege.' 66 In consequence, it required disclosure of
160 In re Gordon was handed down on December 5, 1983, while In re Durant was is-
sued on December 7, 1983. Both opinions are authored by Judge Krupansky, and
Gordon's analysis rests upon Durant's discussion of the exceptions to the rule of exclu-
sion, and its rejection of the "last link" exception. 722 F.2d at 307.
161 722 F.2d at 305.
162 Id.; see also supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
163 722 F.2d at 307 (citing In re Durant, 723 F.2d at 451).
164 Id. It was apparent that Doe's relationship comprehended legal assistance in the
incorporation of several corporations, and did not seek legal advice for a past crime.




Gordon's client's identity. 167 Yet the court's reasoning fails to ad-
dress the real issue raised and protected by the "substantial disclo-
sure exception." When (by whatever means) the entire substance of
a privileged conversation is known, save for the identity of the cli-
ent, then more than unprotected facts are revealed by disclosure. In
Harvey, 168 the Fourth Circuit protected the identity of the client be-
cause once that identity is revealed in conjunction with all the other
previously disclosed facts, "[re]ore than the identity of the client will
be disclosed by naming the client."' 69
Certain acts, otherwise seemingly important or unimportant,
gain or diminish in relevance depending upon with whom they are
associated. Disclosure of Doe's identity in a context where the rest
of his communications were known would disclose his motive in
seeking legal advice. Because that is protected by the privilege, 170
and because, as will be discussed within, disclosure of Doe's identity
might incriminate him before the grand jury, his identity should
have been considered a confidential communication within the
"substantial disclosure exception."
The same analysis, showing that disclosure of client identity
might be incriminatory and certainly would reveal the "ultimate mo-
tive" of consultation by the client, holds true in the second and third
inquiries as well. Nevertheless, the Gordon court failed to consider
these implications, relying as it did upon In re Durant, which elimi-
nated the obvious concern of incrimination of the client. With a
"last link" exception rejected, the "legal advice" exception limited,
and facile analysis of the applicability of privilege such as appears in
In re Gordon, it is apparent that few circumstances, if any, will fall
within the now very narrow exceptions to the identity exclusion.
VII. POSSIBILITY OF PROTECTION THROUGH
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
It is well recognized that the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination is a purely personal privilege. 17 1 As a con-
cept, it is fundamental to our system ofjustice. Still, despite its lim-
its, our concern that no man be required to incriminate himself from
167 Id.
168 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965).
169 Id. at 905.
170 "A communication as to ... the ultimate motive of the litigation, is equally pro-
tected with others, so far as any policy of the privilege is concerned." 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2313 (quoted in Tillotson, 350 F.2d at 666); In re Jones, 517 F.2d at 674.




his own mouth has penetrated the attorney-client privilege. 172 The
Baird court's belief that disclosure of the client's identity may "well
be the link [to] form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a federal crime"173 reflected this conclusion, and it has
since been imported, in some form, into each of the exceptions to
the identity exclusion. 174 There is, accordingly, substantial author-
ity to consider questions of incrimination where client identity is
sought to be compelled. 75
Under Fisher, the fifth amendment privilege of a client has clear
application, through the attorney-client privilege, to the attorney's
disclosure of information. 176 Quoting Wigmore, the Supreme
Court emphasized: "It follows, then, that when the client himself would
be privileged from production of the document, either as a party at
common law. . . or as exempt from self-incrimination, the attorney
having possession of the document is not bound to produce. 177 A
1982 case from the New York Court of Appeals, In the Matter of Van-
derbilt,178 addressed precisely this question and determined that
when the attorney-client privilege applies, "counsel cannot be com-
pelled to deliver material that would be privileged [as against self-
incrimination] in the client's hands."'179
Vanderbilt dealt with what the court assumed to be a tape-re-
corded confession to an attempted murder. The client attempted
suicide after making the recording, and his wife delivered the cas-
sette tape to his attorney.' 80 Recognizing that the attorney had no
right directly to assert the client's fifth amendment privilege, the
New York Court of Appeals nevertheless relied upon Fisher, stating:
"[Aln attorney may rely on the attorney-client privilege to prevent
discovery of materials that would not have been discoverable if in
172 See, e.g., In re Pavlick, 680 F.2d 1026; In re Jones, 517 F.2d 688; Tillotson, 350 F.2d
663; Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347; Harvey, 349 F.2d 900; Baird, 279 F.2d 623.
173 279 F.2d at 633 (citing Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486).
174 See supra note 172. It is, of course, recognized that In re Osterhoudt, In re Durant
and In re Gordon represent a rejection of this position and these concerns.
175 See supra notes 48-96 and accompanying text.
176 425 U.S. at 404.
177 425 U.S. at 404 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2307) (emphasis added in
Fisher).
178 57 N.Y.2d 66, 453 N.Y.S.2d 662, 439 N.E.2d 373 (1982).
179 Id. at 80, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 670, 439 N.E.2d at 386.
180 Id. at 70-71, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 665, 439 N.E.2d at 380-81. The court remanded the
case to determine the capacity in which the client's wife acted. Id. at 80, 453 N.Y.S.2d at
670-71, 439 N.E.2d at 386. If she acted as her husband's agent in soliciting legal advice
by delivering the cassette, then the court held the client's rights remain intact and the
tape is privileged. Id.
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the client's hands."'' 8 Vanderbilt, therefore, applied concepts of fifth
amendment self-incrimination through the attorney-client privilege
to protect the client's incriminating utterances from being dis-
closed,182 and it stands as an intermediate step between Fisher and
cases such as In re Grand Jury Proceedings-Gordon.
In Fisher, the Court only passed on documents that could be pro-
tected by the privilege.' 83 In Vanderbilt, the very voice of the client,
incriminating himself, was the subject of compulsion. 84 In Gordon,
the government sought to compel the lawyer to divulge the client's
identity and link him to certain acts, in a manner no less incriminat-
ing than compelling the client himself to testify to the acts.' 85 Inas-
much as the lawyer's only knowledge of the client's identity and
actions came from their relationship and the client could not be
compelled to testify about his acts, then under Fisher and Vanderbilt's
rationales, Gordon should not have been compelled to testify and
incriminate his client. Such a result clearly conflicts with the long-
standing purpose of the privilege: "The end is, that persons with
safety may substitute others in their [place]; and therefore if you
cannot ask me, you cannot ask that man; for everything said to him,
is as if I had said it to myself, and he is not to answer it.' '186
The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Gordon generates legitimate con-
cern whether the attorney-client privilege protects confidential com-
munications that could not be compelled from the client. Upon its
specific facts, it would appear that, in line with Fisher and Vanderbilt,
the privilege should hold. Gordon appeared before the grand jury,
identified corporations as having been incorporated by him, and
stated the identities of such corporate and individual clients as were
requested. Only when the government's questions went beyond the
narrow inquiry -"Who is your client?" - did Gordon assert the
privilege. His assertion was in response to questions which stated
communications or acts' 8 7 and which required him to pair his client with
these acts and communications before the grand jury. Recognizing that to
name his client in conjunction with these acts would be nothing less
181 Id. at 75-76, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 668, 439 N.E.2d at 383 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at
404).
182 722 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983).
183 425 U.S. at 394 (income tax documents prepared by client's accountants and pos-
sessed by attorney Fisher).
184 See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
185 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
186 Annesley, 17 How. St. Tr. 1129 (Ex. 1743) (quoted in 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2291).
187 Depending upon the grand jury's perceptions and the name or names given in




than explicitly linking his client with conduct considered illegal by
the grand jury, Gordon necessarily claimed the protections of the
attorney-client privilege.
It is apparent, therefore, that the government was not seeking
the "identity" of Gordon's client or clients. Gordon had revealed
his clients' identities upon demand. What the government did seek,
and what the Sixth Circuit approved and compelled, s8 was the use
of an attorney before the grand jury to testify to privileged relations
and thus expressly to incriminate his client by naming him in re-
sponse to every question setting out incriminatory facts. It is in
these circumstances that the use of the identity exclusion becomes
an overwhelmingly powerful weapon in the government arsenal.
The narrowed availability of the privilege and the court's cursory
analysis of the "substantial disclosure exception," therefore, re-
sulted in a compulsion beyond that contemplated by the identity
exclusion.
In Gordon, the issue was a question of having the attorney repeat
before the grand jury the essential missing element of communica-
tions that had already been disclosed. The missing element was the
client's identity which, if provided, would result in compelled testi-
mony from the attorney that could never have been compelled from
the client consistent with the mandate of the fifth amendment.
It is in these circumstances, where the attorney is asked to in-
criminate his client by revealing information that would disclose an
incriminating communication that could not be compelled from the
client himself, that fifth amendment protection through the attorney-
client privilege is appropriate and necessary.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that the general rule regarding client identity
excludes it from protection under the attorney-client privilege. Yet
conversely, the attorney-client privilege is uniquely valuable to our
system of justice:
In our legal system the client should make full disclosure to the
attorney so that the advice given is sound, so that the attorney can give
all appropriate protection to the client's interest, and so that proper
defenses are raised if litigation results. The attorney-client privilege
promotes such disclosure by promising that communications revealed
for these legitimate purposes will be held in strict confidence. The
privilege encourages persons to seek advice as to future conduct. But
188 On February 4, 1984, Intervenor Doe filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the Supreme Court, No. 83-1309,
which was denied June 11, 1984, 104 S. Ct. 3524 (1984).
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so important is full disclosure that the law recognizes the privilege
even if the advice is sought by one who has already committed a bad
act. Thus, the attorney-client privilege is central to the legal system
and the adversary process. For these reasons, the privilege may de-
serve unique protection in the courts.18 9
At present, the grand jury is the scene for repeated assertions of the
privilege where attorneys are asked to reveal their clients' identities;
and it is apparent that in this setting attorneys will continue to assert
their clients' privilege. 190 That privilege is available without resort
to a contempt citation by client intervention under Perlman v. United
States.19 1 Yet, in view of the limited nature of the exceptions to the
identity exclusion, and recent case law limiting client access to the
attorney-client privilege, the success of such contests is likely to be
limited. Still, the exceptions to the exclusion do maintain some vi-
tality, the concerns of the attorney-client, privilege undeniably carry
much weight, and the possibility of fifth amendment protection
through the attorney-client privilege, in line with Fisher, remains a
powerful argument to be asserted.
189 Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d at 1355.
190 On August 2, 1983, the new MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT were
adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association. The new rules
modify and broaden DR 4-101(A), extending the privilege to information "relating to
representation of a client ... " MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a),
reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 1, 5 (Aug. 16, 1983) (emphasis added).
The new rules do not require the client to indicate information that is to be confi-
dential. ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct (1984) at 55:303. Moreover,
the new MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT deleted the provision of the old
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981) DR 4-101(C)(23), allowing reve-
lation of confidences when "required by law or court order."
Thus, it is clear that in order to follow the dictates of the new rules, an attorney is
obligated to press his client's claims opposing disclosure of identity based upon the
privilege through the courts of appeals, if not to review by certiorari.
191 247 U.S. 7 (1918); see supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also supra note 115
discussing availability of sixth amendment protection when attorney-client privilege is
inapplicable.
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